Cook County and Connecticut submitted their merits briefs to the U.S. Supreme Court on October 21, defending their restrictions on AR-15-platform and similar semiautomatic rifles. The governments argue that historical restrictions on unusually dangerous weapons support the bans even when the firearms are widely owned. Their submissions in the consolidated Viramontes v. Cook County and Grant v. Higgins cases answer the challengers' common-use argument. They are legal arguments, not a Supreme Court ruling or a change in what owners may possess.
The Court granted review on June 30 and consolidated the cases, Nos. 25-238 and 25-566, for briefing and oral argument. The question presented concerns whether the Second and Fourteenth Amendments guarantee the right to possess AR-15-platform and similar semiautomatic rifles. Both governments are defending favorable lower-court decisions, but those decisions came at different stages of litigation, a distinction that matters when describing what the justices are reviewing.
Viramontes began in August 2021. After discovery and competing summary-judgment motions, the district court ruled for Cook County; the Seventh Circuit affirmed. In Grant, the challengers sought a preliminary injunction against Connecticut's restrictions. The district court denied that request, and the Second Circuit affirmed. The Connecticut appeal therefore concerns a refusal to grant preliminary relief, not the same final summary-judgment posture as the Cook County case.
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The governments' historical argument
Cook County's brief argues that the purpose and operation of its ordinance resemble historical regulation of weapons considered exceptionally dangerous. It invokes restrictions involving affrays, trap guns, Bowie knives and slungshots, among other examples. The county also argues that technological change and new public-safety concerns permit contemporary restrictions. Those are the county's proposed historical analogies; the Supreme Court has not adopted them as a justification for this ordinance.
Connecticut's brief makes a related argument against treating common use as decisive. It contends that governments historically restricted some weapons precisely because their prevalence created public-safety concerns. The state also disputes the challengers' reading of the phrase “dangerous and unusual,” arguing that the historical inquiry concerns unusually dangerous weapons rather than a requirement that the weapons be rare. Whether that interpretation survives review is one of the contested legal questions, not an established result of these filings.
Connecticut separately challenges what it describes as a use-it-or-lose-it rule for legislative authority. Its example is the federal assault-weapons ban enacted in 1994 and allowed to expire in 2004: the state argues that Congress's decision not to extend that law cannot permanently prevent later regulation as ownership grows. This addresses the legal significance of prevalence, rather than announcing a new ownership threshold or a numerical test the Court has approved.
Different definitions and existing exceptions
The briefs also describe how the challenged laws reach rifles. Cook County identifies both named firearms and a feature-based definition, with prohibited conduct extending beyond sales to acquisition and possession. Its account describes exemptions involving law enforcement and interstate travel, along with exclusions for antique, inoperable and Olympic-target firearms. Those descriptions explain the ordinance being defended; they are not newly created exceptions or a determination that a particular owner's firearm qualifies.
Connecticut describes its definition as covering semiautomatic centerfire rifles capable of accepting a detachable magazine and having at least one listed feature. Its list includes a folding or telescoping stock, specified trigger-hand grip positioning, a forward pistol grip, a flash suppressor, and a grenade or flare launcher. The state also describes certificates of possession allowing qualifying existing owners to retain their firearms. The brief does not announce a new certificate application period or permission to acquire a newly prohibited rifle.
For owners and dealers, neither submission provides relief from the challenged restrictions. A defense brief cannot itself suspend enforcement, authorize a transaction or establish a nationwide exemption. The Court still must decide the constitutional question and determine the appropriate disposition of these differently situated appeals. The filings also do not settle how broadly an eventual opinion would apply beyond the rifles and laws before the justices.
The Second Amendment Foundation said on October 22 that it plans to answer the governments' positions in a reply. The Court's docket sets the consolidated oral argument for Wednesday, December 2, with one hour allotted. No decision date is listed.
About the Author
Nick Sawinyh - Nick Sawinyh is a father, husband, hobby farmer, and gun enthusiast from Kentucky. He founded GunsNation and writes most of what appears on this blog.
